

THE HABSBURG MONARCHY AND SERBS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE UP UNTIL THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA (1739–1815)*

Original Scientific Article

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The principal objective of this article is to demonstrate some key segments in the development of political relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Serbian population in the Ottoman Empire up until the Congress of Vienna in 1815. During the 18th century, the Monarchy played an active role in the instigation of Serbs to become involved in Austro–Turkish wars and to form strong liberation movements. The Ottoman feudal system was confronted with the developments that deeply disturbed the entire legal and socio-economic structure of the Empire. Their consequences within the territory of the Belgrade pashaluk struck the subservient Serbian Christian population, so called ‘rayah’, through exposure to ‘chiflik’ system, terror by authorities, forced migrations, epidemics and starvation. The movements which were most prominent in the territory of the Belgrade pashaluk led towards great liberation rebellion of the Serbs known as the Serbian Uprising of 1804.

Key words: Habsburg Monarchy, Belgrade Pashaluk, Ottoman Empire, janissaries, Serbian people, Austro–Turkish war

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*D*UE TO GRADUAL COLLAPSE OF THE FEUDAL system, the Ottoman Empire was less and less considered a threat to the Habsburg Monarchy, while the European courts revived their plans regarding division of Ottoman territory. After the Great Vienna War, the Habsburg monarchy used the new situation to set its final goal, the conquest of the area of Podunavlje and the Balkans. The fact that the Ottoman Empire was beginning to show serious signs of weakness in military terms, especially regarding weaponry and chain of command, even more fueled the Habsburg rulers' ambition to take different steps in foreign policy, with ultimate goal to occupy new territories under the guise of protection of the Christian population in the Ottoman Empire. After the unsuccessful siege of Vienna in 1683, prevailing opinion was that Orthodox population, which had for centuries been under the Ottoman rule, was eagerly waiting to start the uprising and gain freedom (Parvev 2015, 20). Following the achieved military success, the Habsburg monarchy was openly showing its ambition, supporting it with its scholarly historical and legal discussions.

In historical discourse on Habsburg dynasty authors focus their interest to the territory south of the Sava and the Danube since the Austro-Turkish War 1716–1718. After the war and the treaty signed in Požarevac in 1718, the Serbian territory south of the Sava and the Danube, once again after 1689, became part of the Habsburg monarchy. The twenty-year-long rule in the newly conquered country, "The Kingdom of Serbia" (*Königreich Serbien*), was arranged according to the principle of Timisoara Banat, with the administration consisting of representatives of the Court War Council (*Hofkriegsrath*) and the Royal Chamber (*Hofkammer*) (Bidermann 1972, 233; Mihneva 1996 81; Поповић 1950, 13, 49, 51; Гавриловић 1991, 13; Langer 1898, 157, 200; Hajek 1912, 7). Increasing the number of subjects in the country depopulated by wars was the primary task of the so-called Belgrade Administration. Apart from Belgrade, which was populated by Germans from the western German provinces, the rest of Serbia was mostly inhabited by Serbian population. This period was marked by the beginning of the first agitation to attract Christians, predominantly Serbian population of the Ottoman Empire, who were offered tax benefits, all in order to achieve greater population density and reconstruction of a great number of abandoned villages. Although the motives were partly linked to the achievement of fiscal policy, the monarchy was careful to solidify its border with the Ottoman Empire, creating a Serbian folk militia under the

command of local obercaptains, Vuk Isaković, Staniša Marković Mlatišuma, and Kosta Dimitrijević (Пецињачки 1976, 158–160, 165–167). Participation in these military formations and life at the border were the biggest reasons of sporadic migrations throughout entire period of Austrian rule (Katsiardi–Hering, Madouvalos 2015, 18), as was confirmed by several Austrian censuses conducted in Serbia.¹ In this way, the monarchy did not only strengthen the border and its influence among the Serbs in the Ottoman Empire, but also prepared the ground for further conquests. Due to the alliance with Russia, which was at war with the Ottoman Empire from 1736, Charles VI ordered the Habsburg army to begin preparations for the war. Military operations in 1737 were preceded by preparations and arrangements with the patriarch Arsenije Jovanović, to raise rebellion of Serbs in the Ottoman Empire. The outcome of the Austro–Turkish war of 1737–1739, in the form of the Treaty of Belgrade, was disadvantageous for the monarchy (Herzfeld 1919, 4–5), but also for the Serbs, who, led by the patriarch, faced the second great migration.²

After the period of peace, starting in 1739, there was a feudal anarchy in the Ottoman Empire, which brought to the surface all the defects of the Ottoman system. In such a milieu, the Serbs managed to build and strengthen their internal self-government in small local units called ‘knežina’ and villages. The process of ‘chiftlicization’, forced migration and difficult life only further contributed to the Serbs’ decision to re-engage in the Austro–Turkish war of 1788–1791 on the side of the Habsburg monarchy (Свирчевић 2003, 193). The Russian successes in the war against the Turks (1768–1774) forced the Habsburg Monarchy to reactivate in the area of the Belgrade Pashaluk and revive its operations after a long break. The intention of the Russian Empress, Catherine II of Russia, to liberate the Balkans from the Turks and bring its empire to the shores of the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea, caused a great discomfort in Vienna. After the failure in the war with Prussia, Habsburgs could not allow the failure in the Balkans. As each direct confrontation with Russia could cause its alliance with Prussia, Vienna decided on a policy of compromise with St. Petersburg (Zöllner 1984, 320). Therefore, in 1780, in Mogilev, a meeting between the Russian Empress, Catherine II, and the Austrian ruler, Joseph II, was held, leading to the alliance between the two empires

1 For the description and the structure of all the established captainaries in Serbia, see: Пецињачки 1977; Веселиновић 1984, 5–42; Пецињачки 1977а.

2 For more details about the Treaty of Belgrade, see in: Baramova 2015, 115–121.

in 1782. The basis of the agreement was the division of the Balkan Peninsula into the Russian and Austrian sphere of interest. Russia planned to create two new countries in the Balkans: Dacia, which would include Wallachia, Moldova, and Bessarabia, and Byzantium, with its capital in Tsargrad, led by Prince Constantine the Great, the grandson of the Russian empress. The Monarchy, for its part, wanted the territory from Wallachia to Olt, Nikopol, Vidin, Orsova, Belgrade, and the shortest line from Belgrade to the mouth of the river Drin to the Adriatic Sea (Поповић 1996, 117–123).

Serbia was not involved in the Russian plan, and was not a part of any combination. The Monarchy had a similar attitude, and did not support the creation of a new Serbian state, as it would mean the strengthening of Orthodoxy. Only one year after the establishment of the alliance, Russia attacked the Ottoman Empire and occupied Crimea. The Russians then offered Austrians to immediately jointly declare the war on the Ottoman Empire, but they refused, claiming not to be ready for war. Although it refused to take part in the war, the Monarchy immediately began scouting the area and strong political agitation among the Serbian population on the territory of the Belgrade Pashaluk. Austrian agents quickly established numerous contacts with the Serbian leaders, who were exposed to serious oppression by the Turkish authorities and the janissaries, and eagerly anticipated alliance with the Christian state, which would bring them liberation from Turkish slavery (Гавриловић 1978, 36–60). As time passed, relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire worsened. Many unsolved problems culminated in 1787, when the Porte declared war on Russia. Already in 1787, in the Black Sea port Kherson, Catherine II and Joseph II agreed on further steps the two forces should take against the Ottoman Empire. The first war operations in which Russia had success started during the year. The Habsburg Monarchy did not immediately enter the war. It happened in February 1788 (Stadtmüller 1966, 80). Turkish authorities closely followed the development of the situation in the Belgrade Pashaluk. To prevent possible insurrectionist movements in Serbia, the Turkish authorities, during the Austrian war preparations (1787), undertook violent disarming of the Serbian people. In extensive actions, which the Turks carried out in a number of villages under the pretext of looking for hidden weapons, the Serbian people were exposed to intense terror of the Turkish military and Bashibazouk units. Fleeing from the Turkish terror, many people fled across the Sava and the Danube to the Austrian side, making volunteer troops, “Free Corps” (*Freikorps*), under the com-

mand of Austrian officers. Austrian supreme command needed these troops to facilitate the operation of regular troops, and for causing a possible mass uprising in Serbia. Commander-in-Chief of the Serbian Free Corps was an active Austrian Major, Mihailo Mihaljević. When the attempt to make a foray into Belgrade and the surrounding fortifications with the help of the Serbs in early December 1787 failed, in early February, the Monarchy launched military operations against the Turks (Ђоровић 1993, 501–503).

Serbian volunteers actively participated in battles with the Turkish armed forces and raids on Turkish ships on the Danube. Koča Anđelković particularly distinguished himself among the Serbian volunteers who fought against the Turks. Born in the area of Jagodina, he was a former trader, who, in mid-1787, fled from Turkish terror to the Monarchy. At that time, Radič Petrović fought side by side with Koča, forming the first Serbian military unit, a company with Koča Anđelković and young Karađorđe Petrović.³ Koča actively participated in battles against Turkish forces. After the attack of Austrian army and Free Corps on Smederevo, Koča refused to return to Austrian territory, but moved into the interior of Serbia with a group of Serbian fellow fighters. With his small troop, Koča attacked the Turks, and in a very short time liberated Požarevac, Hasan Pasha's Palanka, Batočina, and Bargdan, where he placed his headquarters. Solidifying his position in the Bagrdan Gorge, Koča conquered the Tsargrad Road, which was the most important Turkish road in Serbia (Пантелић 1930, 38–39; Гавриловић 1985, 31–45). Military success and great personal courage raised Koča's reputation among the people, so his troops grew to about 500 fighters in a short time. Having received manpower reinforcements, Koča continued attacks against the Turks. In a surprise raid, Koča and his fellow fighters attacked the janissary garrison in Kragujevac, achieving great victory. People named this whole war effort "Koča's Frontier". Taking Kragujevac and cutting the Tsargrad Road were the ultimate achievements by Koča and his fellow fighters. The Austrian command awarded Koča the rank of a captain and the gold medal, but denied him the much-needed military aid and weaponry. Serbian fighters were left on their own, fighting almost daily with numerous Turkish detachments (Ђорђевић 1979, 19–30). The entire 1788 was full of missed opportunities. The Austrians did not start decisive operations, and the Turks regrouped after

3 Arhiv Srbije (hereinafter referred to as: AS), Ministarstvo prosvete i crkvenih dela (hereinafter referred to as: MPs-P), 1841, f II, r 47, B No. 1672, Ivanjica 1 October 1841; Ibid, B No. 1564/1841.

first surprises, and launched a broad offensive. The first target was military unit of Koča Anđelković. In mid-April one janissary detachment, under the command of Deli Ahmet, began to suppress the Serbian rebels. Since Austrian command hesitated to begin decisive operations and failed to help Koča with arms and ammunition, while the Turks, on the other hand, constantly reinforced their forces, Koča's unit was getting into increasingly difficult position. The permanent attacks of the Turks, devastation of villages, hunger due to unproductive year, and Turkish preparations for a general attack on rebellious areas made Koča dissolve the unit and join a volunteer detachment under Austrian command, as the leader of one of the companies. Having eliminated the resistance of Koča's and other detachments, the Turks began to implement large-scale terror over the people. Fleeing from the Turkish scimitars, a large number of Serbs left their homes and sought refuge in the Habsburg Monarchy. It is estimated that just until the end of June, around 50,000 people fled to the Monarchy. After crushing Serbian detachments, in the summer of 1788, the Turks transferred the battlefield to the Austrian soil. Their offensive in Banat surprised the weak Austrian forces, so Turks occupied the entire southern Banat and entered Pančevo. In the battles with the Turks, while defending mining town of Brzasko, captain Koča was killed (Лышић 1993, 32–40; Пантелић 1930, 11).

Similar to Koča's detachment, another detachment was active in the Homolje, led by Marjan Jovanović. He gathered 300 fighters and from Homolje went to Resava, where his detachment, which had since grown to 700 people, roamed between Ćuprija and Požarevac. Jovanović's detachment remained in that territory until the beginning of May, when it was forced by strong Turkish pressure from Vidin to cross the Danube and move to the Monarchy. In early 1789, Jovanović's detachment returned to Serbia, but this time as a unit under the command of the Austrian army. In addition to Koča's and Jovanović's detachments, volunteer detachments under the command of Austrian army officers, Mihailo Mihaljević and Branavački took part in the fighting against the Turks. These detachments were from the beginning under the command of the General Staff of the Austrian army, and led actions coordinated with the movements of the Austrian army units (Јакшић 1937, 39–42). Mihaljević's detachment excelled in the battles for Šabac, in which the people of Šabac and Valjevo nahias took part, as well as in actions in Valjevo and Zvornik, while Branavački's detachment participated in the battles near Poreč, Brza Palanka, Kladovo, Negotin, and accros the river Timok (Pantelić

1930, 9). Volunteer detachments had great help from the people of the regions in which they conducted military operations. It was estimated that at the time of the uprising in 1804, there were about 18,000 soldiers who participated in war activities from 1788 to 1790, which represented significant force with great military experience (Ивић 1935, 67).

Turkish offensive in Banat did not last long. Insufficiently prepared for long-term warfare, Turkish army quickly lost its offensive power and failed to utilize its initial success. In fall, both sides agreed on a truce that lasted until summer 1789. The first months of 1789 brought major problems to the Austrian Empire. Their main competitor in the German world, Prussia, entered into an alliance with England and the Netherlands, which was directly aimed against Austrian interests. When the news came to Vienna that Prussia intended to draw Ottoman Empire into the alliance, the Habsburg Monarchy decided on a swift and decisive military campaign, in order to compel the Ottoman Empire to capitulate. In late August, the Austrian army crossed the border and immediately began to expel the Turkish troops. In late September the Austrians conquered Belgrade and began to advance into the interior of the Belgrade Pashaluk.⁴ Despite significant victories they achieved in the war with Ottoman Empire, the Austrian court increasingly considered the termination of hostilities with the Porte and making peace. The reason for this lay both in the resistance of the Hungarian opposition, which did not support the warlike policy of Joseph II, and in the changes in Western Europe that emerged after the outbreak of the French Bourgeois Revolution. Austro-Turkish war finished with the peace treaty in Svishtov, signed on 4 August 1791. With that peace, concluded with the mediation of England,⁵ Prussia, and the Netherlands (Shaw 1971, 187), the Monarchy renounced all conquest in the Ottoman Empire, with the exception of insignificant corrections of borders. This peace declared the amnesty for Christians, Turkish subjects from Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Wallachia and Moldova, who participated in the war against the Porte (Поповић 1996, 121–123).

4 For a quick conquest of Belgrade Field Marshal Laudon thanked the President of the Court Council of War, Count Hadik, who had given him the draft of the fortress, see: Regele 1949, 58.

5 For more details on the influence of international policy and diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire, with special reference to the British, see: Palmer 2011.

When the Habsburg monarchy signed the peace treaty of Svishtov, thus abandoning the policy of conquest of the Balkan Peninsula, it became clear to the Serbian intelligentsia that the liberation of Serbia could be achieved only by strengthening national movements and relying on own forces. As soon as the clear signs that the Habsburg Monarchy withdrew from the war appeared, Serbian elders began to think independently about the possibility of further armed struggle, and then the political battle to obtain self-government. In January 1790, the Tronoša Archimandrite, Stevan Jovanović, asked Habsburgs to help with troops and weapons, in order to clean Serbia from the Turks, but was rejected. When in late 1790 peace negotiations began, Jovanović expected, given previous promises, that the Austrian emperor would put pressure on the Porte, so Serbs in the Belgrade Pashaluk could get certain privileges. When all of that came to nothing, in 1791, Jovanović sent a proclamation to the Porte, demanding same rights for the Serbian people in the Belgrade Pashaluk as those Christians in Wallachia and Moldova already had (Ђорђевић 1979, 57; Ристановић 2000, 39–44).

Upon completion of the Austro-Turkish war, among the measures that the Porte took to consolidate power in the Belgrade Pashaluk, were: banning janissaries to return to the Belgrade Pashaluk and amnesty for the Serbs who participated in the war on the Austrian side. The power in the Belgrade Pashaluk was entrusted to Bećir Pasha, who executed a prominent janissary leader, Deli Ahmet, and issued firman prohibiting janissaries return to the Belgrade Pashaluk. Bećir Pasha's measures provoked rebellion of janissary pashas of Niš, but it was quickly suppressed. The janissaries who were withdrawn from Belgrade and called to Tsargrad rebelled on the way through Bulgaria and joined Kardzhali detachments that roamed northwestern Bulgaria. At the head of these detachments was a renegade from the Porte, Osman Pazvan-oglu.⁶ The general situation in the Ottoman Empire rapidly deteriorated with the French invasion of Egypt in the summer of 1798. Aware of the fact that it could not at the same time wage war against the French and against separatist rebels, the Porte reprieved all the outlaws, among other Pazvan-oglu and janissaries. At the beginning of 1799, the Porte's firman on the return of janissaries to Serbia arrived in the Pashaluk of Belgrade. The return of janissaries meant a renewal of the Turkish terror and the beginning of a new evil (Ђорђевић 1979, 82). All the privileges granted by sultan's firmans in the period from 1793 to 1796

⁶ AS, MPs-P, 1841, f II, r 47, B No. 1614, No. 456, Slatina 15 July 1841; *Ibid.*, No. 348, B No. 1816/1841, Zaječar, 6 October 1841.

were immediately abolished, and Serbian principal self-government was nipped in the bud (Гавриловић 1985, 47–50).

Overcoming the resistance of the sipahis and the people, the janissaries once again introduced *chiflik*, increased duties, while their violence threatened the safety of life and property. This situation affected all layers of Serbian people. During the two-year dahian rule, Serbian people in the Belgrade Pashaluk were so pressured by exploitation and abuse that the way out of this situation could only be sought in direct collision with the dahian system. Slaughter of local chieftains accelerated the maturation of the obvious contradictions between the Serbian nation and the Turks, and was the immediate cause of the outbreak of the Serbian uprising.

The 1804 uprising in Serbia marked the beginning of social and national processes, leading to the creation of the new Serbian state and society in the 19th century, as an expression of a new, independent state formation in the recent history of the Balkan peoples. Serbian revolution that began in 1804 had a double meaning for international relations and the interests of the major powers involved in the Eastern issue: the specific, seen in the context of the political situation of the early 19th century, and general, viewed through the prism of a longer historical process that developed in the Balkans during the 19th century (Павловић 2001, 4–45). The main task of foreign policy of Serbia during the uprising (1804–1813) was to protect the achievements of the uprising. Initially, it was thought that, with the armed opposition to dahias first, and then to Sultan himself, this could be achieved, if Tsargrad was willing or somehow forced to accept the guarantees of some of the European powers, primarily the Habsburg Monarchy or Russia. However, neither did the Porte agree to let some European power interfere in its internal affairs, nor did the Austrian and Russian courts want to give the rebellious Serbs some special rights that would challenge the sovereignty of the Porte on its territory. The Austrian court held that the rebellious Serbs could be given concessions and privileges they had in Belgrade Pashaluk before the arrival of dahias to power, but still considered Serbia a part of Turkish territory (Ивић 1937, 246–253).

The Vienna government's pretext was the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the friendship between the two empires. However, in order to keep its trade, the Monarchy held a liberal position towards the Serbian uprising, although it occasionally, for political reasons, ordered the closure of its borders on the Sava and the Danube rivers, and made preparations for the

possible occupation of the border fortresses of Serbia. Best favor to Serbian rebels was given by Emperor Franz, who, in March 1806, wrote a personal letter to Sultan Selim III, advocating the Porte's moderation in the pacification of the Serbian uprising (Јакшић 1933, 29). According to this Austrian policy, Serbian rebel leaders sought to win the protection of the Viennese court (1804 and 1805), without rejecting even the possibility of Austrian occupation of the already liberated territory of Serbia and acceptance of Serbs as its subjects. The rejected rebels turned to Russia, but this initiative achieved more in the moral and material, than in the political sense. Rebel leaders' efforts to make Habsburgs and Russia interested in the Serbian uprising resulted in the fact that the Porte, in refusing the mediation and guarantees of the Austrian and Russian courts, occasionally sent its emissaries to Serbia, which could be considered a certain gain for the Serbs (Pavlovitch 1961, 34–37).

Until the end of 1806, political relations between the Monarchy and Serbian rebels were of unofficial nature, which did not deny the sovereignty of the Porte, but, at the same time, led to the acceptance of the new situation and the maintenance of political and other ties with rebel leaders. The Monarchy regulated the border issues and disputes on the Sava and the Danube, trade disputes, issues of smuggling and crime, and the issue of navigation on the Sava and the Danube (Lampe and Jackson 1982, 111). The Monarchy did not solve all these issues in Tsargrad, but through direct talks with Karađorđe, as the supreme representative of the rebels. The building of stronger political relations between the Habsburg Monarchy and Serbia occurred in 1807, when these relations intensified in several aspects. The entry of Russia into war with Ottoman Empire, Napoleon's victories against the Prussians, the Treaty of Tilsit, the Russian–Turkish armistice in Slobozia, and especially the Rebellion of Tican in Srem (1807) were of great importance for further development of Austro-Serbian relations (Стојанчевић 2013, 199–200). In February and March 1808 in St. Petersburg, the French envoy and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs designed the project on the division of Ottoman Empire, according to which Serbia became independent under the government of an Austrian prince, who would marry a Great Russian duchess. In addition to this project, sometime later, another one appeared, according to which the territory made up of Serbia and Macedonia with Thessaloniki was handed over to the Monarchy. At the same time, the Monarchy, relying on the tacit approval of

32 France, sought to persuade the rebel leaders to surrender Belgrade. The Petrova-

radin commander, Field Marshal Simbshen, who was particularly engaged in this task, promised compensation to the Serbs in the form of Austrian protection at the Porte (Jelavich 1983, 45–47).

Freed from direct Turkish pressure due to ceasefire in Slobozia and Russia's support in this, Serbs did not find it difficult to refuse the Austrian offer, even at the cost Austria closes its borders. Year 1809 brought a change of war fortune at the Serbian–Turkish front. The attacks of the Turkish army that occurred in the summer of the same year threatened to completely break down the defense of Serbian rebels. Having no faith in the Russian military help, Karađorđe turned to Monarchy for help in mid-August, offering it in return to occupy the Serbian territory. The Austrian court was not willing to have problems with the Porte, France, and even the Russians, and refused this offer, pointing out that it was ready to mediate at the Porte so that the pacification of Serbian uprising could be conducted in a gentle way (Djordjević and Fisher–Galati 1981, 14–20). Item VIII of the Treaty of Bucharest (1812) provided for the self-government of the Serbian people and the return of the Turks to Serbia. After a short hesitation, Serbs rejected the requirements of the Treaty of Bucharest, continuing the fight for full independence. The military inferiority of Serbia in relation to major resources of the Ottoman Empire, and its diplomatic isolation in Europe, after almost ten years of success in the war with Ottoman Empire, brought Serbia into a hopeless situation (Јакшић 1937, 23–30; Стојанчевић 1980, 192–194).

Left to themselves, Serbian rebels decided to start the last battle with the Turks. From the beginning of July to the beginning of October 1813, in all areas of the Serbian front, the rebels offered desperate resistance. The First Serbian uprising was brought to an end. The collapse of the First Serbian Uprising initiated a large migration of Serbian population into the Habsburg Monarchy and Wallachia. More than 120,000 people crossed into the Habsburg territory, and around twenty thousand into Wallachia. Nearly all of the northern Serbia, especially Šumadija, was practically deserted. Belgrade was also completely cleared of its Christian and Jewish inhabitants at the time (Илић, Михаиловић and Колаковић 1969, 421–423). The restoration of the Ottoman Empire in Serbia was complemented by horrific Turkish tyranny. Jihad meant a real catastrophe for the Serbian population of the Belgrade pashaluk. Many Serbian infants were seized into slavery, so entire nahiyas in the northern parts of Serbia were totally desolate (Поповић 1950, 78).

Following the departure of the great vizier Hurshid-pasha, it was Sulejman-pasha Skopljak who was consigned as the first in command of the Belgrade pashaluk. His appointment followed after Porta's declaration of amnesty and the appeal upon the Serbian refugees to return to the Belgrade pashaluk. After a period of war pillages and depredation, the Turks alleviated their antagonistic behavior towards the Serbian nation. The need to prevent the trade in Belgrade pashaluk from complete breakdown, as well as the fear from potential formation of hayduks and guerilla in the region of the main trade routes of the pashaluk, forced the Turks to relax their repressive measures towards the Serbian raya and reinstate a regular state in the occupied Serbia (Гавриловић 1907, 63–65, 70–74). The refusal of the Austrian Court to repatriate the exiled commanders of the uprising, urged Turkish authorities to invite rebels still hiding in Serbia to surrender. This was primarily directed to Stanoje Glavaš and Miloš Obrenović, who were, after the surrender, given a pardon by the Turkish authorities and as such became involved in the Turkish regime in the pashaluk. Glavaš was appointed main guardian of the Emperor's road from Ćuprija to Belgrade, while Miloš Obrenović was first appointed 'oberknez' of the Rudnik nahiyah, and then also of Požega and Kragujevac (Стојанчевић 1980, 159–160).

However, Turkish benevolence did not last for long and, as early as the first months of 1814, the terror of the Turkish authorities began again. Under a pretext of searching for weapons and the hayduks, Turkish military units infiltrated Serbian villages, leaving a devastation behind. In the same period taxes were raised for the Serbian rayah, and enforced community work – 'kuluk' was introduced to repair the Belgrade fortress and Turkish fortifications destroyed during the uprising. In mid-September 1814, the vicious regime of Sulejman-pasha Skopljak instigated Hadži Prodan's Revolt. Poorly organized, despite spreading to Požega, Kragujevac and Jagodina nahiyas, the revolt suffered a quick breakdown. The failure of Hadži Prodan's revolt triggered a cruel reprisal by the Turkish authorities. Stanoje Glavaš was one of many Serbs who were killed, and whose heads were displayed on the walls of the Belgrade fortress. The conditions in Belgrade pashaluk resembled, to a great extent, those of the dahiya's reign, when zulum and anarchy pervaded all around (Лаповић 1950, 70–74).

34 | Meanwhile, the Congress of great powers took place in Vienna, with a task to reinstate the order in Europe, thoroughly disturbed by the French Revolution and Napoleon wars. France's defeat and arrival of the allies in Paris (March 1814),

roused a hope for the Serbs that their faith would become of interest to the great European powers, and that the conditions in Serbia would improve (Ђорђевић 1995, 20, Стојанчевић 1966, 42–43). News of preparations for the Congress of Vienna echoed among the Serbs in the Belgrade Pashaluk, as well as among Serbian immigrants in the Monarchy. At the end of December 1814, Serbian delegates, Prota Matija Nenadović and Jevta Čotrić, were received by the Austrian Emperor Franz I, who promised them he would advocate the relieving of the difficult position of Serbs in the Belgrade Pashaluk at the Porte. However, different attitude of European courts regarding the survival of Turkish rule in Europe, as well as the return of Napoleon from the Elbe and new war with France, drew attention of European rulers. Meanwhile, a new armed movement of Serbs broke out in Belgrade Pashaluk, known as the Second Serbian Uprising. Relations between Serbs and great powers and the Ottoman Empire took a new turn.

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Sources:

Rezime:***Habzburška monarhija i Srbi u Osmanskom carstvu do Bečkog kongresa (1739–1815)***

Ratovi evropskih sila protiv Osmanskog carstva donosili su nove potrebe, a gotovo nijedan rat nije protekao bez oružane podrške seljačkih masa. Ustajući i sam na oružje u vreme ratova na Balkanu, srpski narod trpeo je i sve posledice ishoda takvih ratova i politike sila koje su ih vodile. Sve do kraja 18. veka, srpski narod je ustajao na borbu u vreme austro–turskih ratova koji su se vodili i preko Srbije, podržavajući težnje Habzburške monarhije. Proces raspada osmanskog feudalnog sistema doveo je do jačanja versko-nacionalnih i društveno ekonomskih sukoba na Balkanu. Izložen svim ovim udarima, osmanski vojno-politički i feudalni sistem ulazio je u sve veću krizu, koja se naročito osećala u njegovim evropskim provincijama. Iz ove krize nastala je oslobodilačka borba srpskog naroda koja je dovela do velikog oslobodilačkog ustanka i nacionalno-političkog oslobođenja u 19. veku.

Ključne reči: Habzburška monarhija, Beogradski pašaluk, Osmansko carstvo, janičari, srpski narod, austro–turski rat

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